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Propositional Relevance through Letter-Sharing  
 
David Makinson 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The concept of relevance between classical propositional formulae, defined in terms 
of letter-sharing, has been around for a long time. But it began to take on a fresh life 
in the late 1990s when it was reconsidered in the context of the logic of belief change. 
Two new ideas appeared in independent work of Odinaldo Rodrigues and Rohit 
Parikh: the relation of relevance was considered modulo the choice of a background 
belief set, and the belief set was put into a canonical form, called its finest splitting. In 
the first part of this paper, we recall the ideas of Rodrigues and Parikh, and show that 
they yield equivalent definitions of what may be called canonical cell/path relevance. 
The second part presents the main new result of the paper: while the relation of 
canonical relevance is syntax-independent in the usual sense of the term, it 
nevertheless remains language-dependent in a deeper sense, as is shown with an 
example. The final part of the paper turns to questions of application, where we 
present a new concept of parameter-sensitive relevance that relaxes the 
Rodrigues/Parikh definition, allowing it to take into account extra-logical sources as 
well as purely logical ones.   
 
Keywords: relevance, letter-sharing, belief change, splitting, language-dependence.  
 
 
From Syntactic to Canonical Cell/Path Relevance 
 
1. Logical Relevance as a Two-Place Relation between Formulae 
 
Attempts to give formal expression to the notion of relevance between propositional 
formulae go back at least to Belnap (1960), who suggested that a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for one formula to be relevant to another is that they share some 
elementary letter. We call this syntactical relevance. 
 
Definition 1.1. Let a,b be formulae of a given propositional logic. They are 
syntactically relevant to each other iff they share some elementary letter. 
 
In the same paper, Belnap went on to propose that relevance of antecedent to 
consequent should serve as an adequacy condition for any acceptable entailment 
relation in propositional logic. While classical logic fails syntactic relevance, his 
subclassical logic E (for ‘entailment’) satisfies that formal condition, as do a number 
of other subsystems of classical logic that came to be known as ‘relevance logics’.  
 
The present paper is not at all concerned with such relevance logics, and we have no 
desire to weaken the classical one. We are interested in the concept of relevance itself. 
Our purpose is to see how far the simple idea of letter-sharing may be developed into 
a well-behaved formal account of relevance in classical propositional contexts, and 
examine its application to the theory of belief change. 
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Poor behaviour of syntactic relevance. (1) The relation is syntax-dependent. In other 
words, formulae a,b may be classically equivalent to a,b respectively, and a relevant 
to b but a not relevant to b. Moreover (2), for any a, b there are a, b to which they 
are respectively classically equivalent, with a syntactically relevant to b. 
 
Example 1.1. For (1), the formula p(pq) is syntactically relevant to q, but the 
former is classically equivalent to p which is not relevant to q when these letters are 
chosen as distinct. For (2), just put e.g. a  a(rr) and b  b(rr).  
 
Notation. We are using p,q,… for elementary letters, a,b,..,x,y,… for arbitrary 
formulae, A,B,..,K,… for sets of formulae, and ├, ┤├  for the relations of classical 
propositional consequence and equivalence. Classical consequence as an operation is 
written Cn, with Cn(A)  {x: A├ x} as usual. A formula is called contingent iff it is 
neither a tautology nor a contradiction. 
 
To overcome the shortcomings of the syntactic notion, an obvious first move is to 
express each formula in its least letter-set, using the well-known least letter-set 
theorem:  
 
Theorem 1.1. For every set A of formulae, there is a unique least set of elementary 
letters such that A may equivalently be expressed using only letters from that set.  
 
Example 1.2. The unique least letter-set of p(pq) is {p} since p(pq) is 
equivalent to p. On the other hand, the unique least letter-set of p(rq) is 
{p,q,r}, as the formula is not equivalent to any other formula lacking any of those 
letters.  
 
Comments on least letter-set theorem. This theorem should figure in every textbook 
of elementary logic, but in fact is rarely so much as mentioned. We recall:   
 
 Strictly speaking, it holds in this simple form only when the language has a 
primitive zero-ary operator (propositional constant) such as the falsum . In 
such a language, the least letter-set of any tautology or contradiction is . 
Without a zero-ary connective, say with just ,,, tautologies and 
contradictions have many minimal letter-sets (in fact, all the singleton letter 
sets), but no least one (since no formula is bereft of letters). For simplicity of 
formulation, in this paper we work with the falsum.  
 
 Intuitively, the least letter-set theorem is just what anyone would expect, but it 
needs proof. Getting minimal letter sets is trivial since every formula contains 
only finitely many letters. But getting a least one (which, by the antisymmetry 
of set-inclusion, will be unique) requires a bit more work – see e.g. the 
appendix of Makinson (2007).  
 
 Letters in the least letter-set of A are said to be essential (to A) or irredundant 
(in A), those outside are called inessential or redundant (in A). 
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 With this terminology, the theorem may be stated in another manner: the set of 
all letters separately redundant in A, is jointly redundant in A, in the sense that 
A may equivalently be expressed without any of them.  
 
When a formula a has no redundant letters, i.e. when all letters occurring in a are in 
its least letter-set, we say that it is in least letter-set form. It is convenient to use a 
choice function, writing a* for an arbitrarily chosen formula in least letter-set form 
that is equivalent to a. The formula a* is called a least letter-set version of a. 
Likewise for sets A of formulae. 
 
Definition 1.2. Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic. They are said to be 
essentially relevant to each other iff a*,b* share some elementary letter. Equivalently: 
iff every formula equivalent to a shares a letter with every formula equivalent to b. 
 
Example 1.3. Although p(pq) is syntactically relevant to q, it is not essentially 
so, since (p(pq))* = p shares no letter with q* = q. 
      
Features of essential relevance 
 It is syntax-independent in the usual sense: when a, b are tautologically 
equivalent to a, b respectively, then a is essentially relevant to b iff a is 
essentially relevant to b (immediate from definition). 
 No two distinct elementary letters are relevant to each other (immediate from 
definition).  
 It is symmetric (immediate from definition). 
 Reflexive? Nearly: every contingent formula is relevant to itself. Non-
contingent formulae are not relevant to anything (given the presence of the 
falsum in our language). 
 Not transitive. Example: p is essentially relevant to pq which is so to q, but p 
is not to q. 
 Cannot be ‘made transitive’: its transitive closure makes any two contingent 
formulae relevant to each other. Verification: Take contingent a,c. Since they 
are contingent, a* and c* contain letters p and q. Put b = pq = b*.  Then a is 
essentially relevant to b, also b to c, so transitive closure would make a 
relevant to c.  
 
This is all part of the folklore and well documented in the literature (see Appendix A). 
However, things began to take a fresh turn in the late 1990s, when a few people began 
thinking about relevance in the light of formal accounts of belief change. Two basic 
insights emerged. The first was that in that context, the relevance or irrelevance of one 
formula to another may be taken to depend not only on the formulae themselves but 
also on the choice of a background belief set. The second was that this belief set may 
be given a canonical form known as its finest splitting.  
 
As these developments are not very widely known, we explain and comment on them 
in the following two sections. To help the reader keep track of successive definitions, 
Appendix B contains a table of all the different kinds of relevance examined in the 
text. 
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2. Path-Relevance Modulo a Belief Set  
 
Consider any three distinct elementary letters p, q, r. They are not essentially relevant 
to each other. Now consider the belief set K = {pq, qr}. Then it is natural to say 
that from the point of view of K, the letter p is relevant to q, q is relevant to r, and p is 
indirectly relevant to r.  This suggests the following definition. 
 
Definition 2.1. (Rodrigues). Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, and 
let K be a set of formulae serving as a belief set. We say that a is path-relevant to b 
(mod K) iff there is a finite sequence x0,…xn+1 (n  0) of formulae with x0 = a*, xn+1 = 
b*, x1,…,xn  K, and each xi shares at least one letter with xi+1. 
 
Comments. Note that x1,…,xn are required to be elements of K. Thus we are looking at 
finite paths through K. On the other hand, it is not required that either of x0 = a*, xn+1 
= b* is in K (although of course they may be). We do not require that K is closed 
under consequence (though it may be): a belief set is understood to be an arbitrary set 
of formulae of propositional logic.   
 
History. Essentially this notion was introduced by Rodrigues in his thesis (1997), 
Appendix A, definition 8.14. It was also used by Renata Wassermann in her thesis 
(1999) and in subsequent papers e.g. Riana and Wassermann (2004). Actually, these 
authors took a,b instead of a*,b* in the definition, but we have refined it to ensure 
that it is syntax-independent in those two arguments.  
 
Path-relevance generalizes essential relevance in a natural way: the latter amounts to 
the case n = 0 in Definition 2.1. Like essential relevance, path relevance is:  
 
 Syntax-independent in a,b, symmetric, almost reflexive (in the same sense), 
not transitive (even when n  0). 
But with K as parameter, new features emerge. One is rather positive: 
 Distinct elementary letters can be relevant to each other (mod K). Example: 
Modulo K = {pq, qr, s}, p is path-relevant to r but not to s. 
However, some other features are rather undesirable: 
 The relation is syntax-dependent in K. Example: Add to the above K the 
formula (rs)(sr). As this is a tautology, it does not change the strength of 
K. But p is now path-relevant to s.  
 The relation trivializes when the belief set is closed under classical 
consequence. That is, when K = Cn(K), any two contingent formulae a,b are 
path-relevant to each other modulo K. Reason: Since a,b are contingent, each 
of a*, b* has at least one letter. Take any letter p in a*, any letter q in b* and 
note that Cn(K) contains any tautology in these letters, e.g. (pp)(qq). 
 
Can we get around these unpleasant features? One might try tweaking Definition 2.1 
by replacing K by its least letter-set version K*. However, this does nothing to 
eliminate syntax-dependence in K. Example: Both K = {pq} and the equivalent J = 
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{p,q} are already in least letter-set form, but under Definition 2.1 we have p path-
relevant to q modulo K, but not so modulo J.  
 
A better idea is needed, and one was provided by Rohit Parikh in 1999. As well as 
minimizing the set of elementary letters, we need to disentangle them. The formulae 
in the background belief set K need to be ‘combed out’ so that their letters are not 
mixed up with each other more than necessary. In other words, we need to render K as 
modular as possible. Parikh made this idea precise with his concept of the finest 
splitting of a belief set. 
 
 
3. Splittings and Finest Splittings of a Belief Set 
 
We begin with the definition of a splitting of a belief set K, and then pass to that of a 
finest splitting. Notation: We write E(K) for the set of all elementary letters occurring 
in formulae of K, and E0(K) to be the least letter-set of K, i.e. E0(K)  E(K*).   
 
Definition 3.1. (Parikh) Let K be a contingent belief set, expressed in the language of 
classical propositional logic (with a zero-ary connective). Let E = {Ei}iI be a 
partition of its least letter-set E0(K), which by contingency will be non-empty. We say 
that E is a splitting of K iff there is a family {Bi}iI of sets of formulae such that each 
E(Bi)  Ei and K  ┤├   {Bi}iI. In other words, iff K can be represented as the union of 
belief sets each of which uses only letters from one of the cells of the partition. 
 
Background on partitions. (1) Recall that a partition of a non-empty set is a family of 
disjoint non-empty subsets of that set, whose union exhausts the set. (2) The partitions 
of a set can be put in one-one correspondence with the equivalence relations over the 
set. (3) One partition is said to be finer than another iff the equivalence relation 
associated with the former is included (set-theoretically) in the equivalence relation 
associated with the latter; equivalently, iff every cell of the first partition is a subset of 
a cell of the second one. (4) Given any non-empty family of partitions of a set, the 
intersection of all the equivalence relations associated with partitions in the family is 
itself an equivalence relation over the set, and so corresponds to a partition of the set. 
With respect to the fineness relation, it is the infimum (alias greatest lower bound or 
glb) of the family of partitions. 
 
Comments on the definition of splitting. (1) A splitting of K is thus a special kind of 
partition of the least letter-set of K; it is not a partition of K itself. (2) While each 
E(Bi)  Ei  E0(K) it is not required that the sets Bi  K, although their union {Bi}iI 
must be classically equivalent to K. (3) Since each E(Bi)  Ei and the Ei are pairwise 
disjoint, the Bi must be ‘almost’ pairwise disjoint, in the sense that they share no 
formulae containing elementary letters. (4) Since E0(K) is the least letter-set of K and 
K is assumed contingent, it follows that in a splitting each Bi is non-empty and in fact 
E(Bi)  Ei. (5) This definition (and all those that follow) may be extended to cover the 
limiting cases that K is inconsistent or tautologous, but at the cost of limiting-case 
clauses in definitions, theorems and proofs that distract from the main ideas. 
 
History. Actually, Parikh (1999) defined splittings of K for any letter-set E  E0(K), 
e.g. E could be E(K) or the set E(L) of all letters of the language. However, it 
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simplifies formulations to fix it at E0(K). For instance, when E  E0(K) then comment 
(4) above can fail at the edges. Example: Put K  {p, qq}, E  E(K)  {p,q}, B1 
{p} but B2 can be {} or  so that E(B2)  E2  {q}.  
 
Example 3.1. K = {pq, qr, ps, s, (rt)(tr)}. 
 
 E(K) = {p,q,r,s,t} but t is redundant, so E0(K) = {p,q,r,s}.   
 The coarsest splitting of K is evidently the singleton partition of E0(K) with  
E0(K)  {p,q,r,s} itself as the only cell, so that {Bi}iI  B1 = {pq, 
qr, ps, s} ┤├   K. But we can do better than that.  
 A less coarse splitting of K partitions E into two cells E1 = {p,q} and E2 = 
{r,s}, taking B1 = {p,q}, B2 = {r,s}, so that K ┤├  B1 B2.  
 The finest splitting of K partitions E into four singleton cells {p}, {q}, {r}, {s} 
with B1 = {p}, B2 = {q}, B3 = {r}, B4 = {s}, so that K ┤├  B1…B4.  
 
In this very simple example, the finest splitting of E has singleton cells and the 
associated sets B1 to B4 consist of literals. Of course, neither of these features need 
hold. For instance, take K = {(pq)(rs)}. Its finest splitting is into the two-
element cells {p,q}, {r,s}, with B1 = {pq}, B2 = {rs} consisting of non-literals. 
 
Theorem 3.1. (Parikh 1999). Every contingent set K of formulae of classical 
propositional logic has a unique finest splitting.  
 
History. Theorem 3.1 was established for the finite case by Parikh (1999). It was 
extended to the infinite case by Kourousias and Makinson (2007), using a new form 
of interpolation called ‘parallel interpolation’. Both parallel interpolation and the 
finest splitting theorem may be extended to first-order logic.  
 
Comments on the theorem. Strictly speaking, it is the finest splitting E = {Ei}iI of 
elementary letters that is unique. Given such a family, there will evidently be many 
families {Bi}iI with {Bi}iI  ┤├   K and E(Bi)  Ei. However, since in fact each E(Bi) 
 Ei, the different ways of choosing a given Bi do not affect its letters. Moreover, it 
turns out that:  
 
Observation 3.2. For contingent K the Bi associated with the finest splitting of K are 
unique up to tautological equivalence. That is: let K be a contingent belief set, and E 
= {Ei}iI its finest splitting. Suppose  both K ┤├     {Bi}iI and K ┤├     {Bi}iI where 
E(Bi)  Ei and E(Bi)  Ei. Then each Bi ┤├  Bi. 
 
Sketch of proof. This follows from the fact that the Bi are pairwise disjoint. For the 
details, see Appendix C.  
 
Again, it simplifies formulations if we use a choice function: 
 
Definition 3.2. For contingent K, write K
#
 for {Bi}iI for some particular such family 
{Bi}iI. We abuse terminology a little by also calling K
#
 the finest splitting of K.  
 
 7 
Comments on the definition of K
#
. (1) Clearly, when K1 ┤├  K2 then K1
#
  K2
#
. (2) Keep 
in mind that the family {Bi}iI is not necessarily a partition of K, but is formed from a 
certain partition of its least letter-set E0(K). (3) Note that when the finest splitting E = 
{Ei}iI of K has at least two cells, then K
#
 cannot be closed under classical 
consequence –the conjunction of any two formulae from different cells will be in 
Cn(K
#
) but cannot be in K
#
. Even when there is only one cell, K
#
 need not be closed 
under consequence. (4) As we have defined it, the finest splitting K
#
 is always a least 
letter-set version of K. However, a least letter-set version K* of K need not be a finest 
splitting, as in the following simple example.  
 
Example 3.2. Put K  {pq}. Then K is already in a least letter-set form, since there is 
no equivalent set of formulae in fewer letters. But it is not in a finest splitting form, 
since K ┤├  {p}{q}, which partitions E(K) into two singleton cells.  
 
Indeed, if we take a least letter-set version of a belief set K and tangle the letters up in 
any way we like, then so long as we keep it equivalent to K and do not introduce fresh 
letters, we are still in the least letter-set but can be far from a finest splitting. 
 
 
4. Using Finest Splittings to Define Canonical Relevance (Modulo a Belief Set) 
 
How can finest splitting help make the notion of relevance modulo a belief set fully 
syntax-independent in K as well as in a, x? We may see the finest splitting K
#
 = 
{Bi}iI of K as a canonical form for the belief set K, disentangling the roles of the 
different elementary letters as far as is possible without altering the power of K and at 
the same time (under our definition) eliminating redundant letters. We can then refine 
Rodrigues’ notion of path-relevance by taking the path through this canonical 
representation K
#
 instead of through K itself. Thus, replacing x1,…,xn  K by x1,…,xn 
 K# in Definition 2.1, we have the following:   
  
Definition 4.1. Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, K a contingent set 
of formulae serving as a belief set, and K
#
 the finest splitting of K. We say that a is 
canonically path-relevant to b (mod K) iff there is a finite sequence x0,…xn+1 (n  0) 
of formulae with x0 = a*, xn+1 = b*, x1,…,xn  K
#
, and each xi sharing at least one 
letter with xi+1. 
 
Features of canonical path-relevance modulo K: 
 This time x1,…,xn are required to be elements of the canonical form K
#
, so we 
are looking at finite paths through K
#
 (rather than through K itself). As before, 
it is not required that either of x0 = a*, xn+1 = b* is in K
#
 (although of course 
they may be).  
 As desired, path-relevance becomes syntax-independent in the usual sense that 
it is invariant under logical equivalence in argument K as well as in a, b.  This 
follows from the fact, noted in the comments after Definition 3.2, that 
equivalent belief sets have the same finest splitting K
#
.  
 Like plain path-relevance, it is symmetric but not transitive (in the arguments 
a,b with K fixed); almost reflexive (in the same sense as before); distinct 
elementary letters can be relevant to each other (mod K).   
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There is another way of arriving at the same concept. It also uses Parikh’s notion of 
the finest splitting K
#
 of K, but does not consider paths. Instead, it looks at cells.  
 
Definition 4.2. (Parikh 1999). Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic and 
K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set with E = {Ei}iI the finest 
splitting of K. We say that a is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K) iff either a* 
shares some letter with b*, or there is a cell Ei of E such that each of a* and b* shares 
some letter (not necessarily the same letter) with Ei.  
 
More formally: iff either E(a*)E(b*) is non-empty, or for some i  I, each of the 
sets E(a*)Ei and E(b*)Ei is non-empty. 
 
Table 4.1: Illustration of canonical cell-relevance 
 
E1 E2 E3 
p                        q r                                        s   t                        u 
E(a*) E(b*) 
 
In this illustration of the principal case of the definition, the finest partition E of K has 
three cells, each containing two elementary letters. The letters in a* and b* are 
disjoint, but there is a cell (the middle one) that contains letters r, s from E(a*), E(b*) 
respectively. Thus a is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K). However, if E(b*) 
consisted of just t,u then a would not be canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K).  
 
History. Actually, Definition 4.2 is implicit rather than explicit in Parikh (1999). 
Moreover, both that paper and Kourousias and Makinson (2007) use E(a), E(b) rather 
than E(a*), E(b*).  
 
Surprisingly, the following equivalence does not appear to have been noticed in the 
literature.  
 
Theorem 4.1. Canonical path-relevance is equivalent to canonical cell-relevance. In 
detail: let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, and let K be a contingent 
set of formulae serving as a belief set. Then a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod 
K) iff it is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K). 
 
Sketch of proof: Left to right, the essential idea is that there can be no paths across 
cells. Right to left, paths must span the cells. For details, see Appendix C. 
 
Remark on the theorem. The first disjunct in the definition of canonical cell relevance 
corresponds to the case n  0 in the definition of canonical path relevance. 
 
Summary of the story so far. By using Parikh’s notion of the finest splitting of K, we 
can refine Rodrigues’ account of path-relevance to make it syntax-independent in all 
three arguments a, b, K. This notion of canonical path-relevance is equivalent to the 
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more semantic-looking one of canonical cell-relevance. The equivalence suggests 
robustness of the concept, which henceforth we call simply canonical relevance.  
 
Warning. Canonical relevance depends only on the logical power of K, but is not 
monotonically increasing in that power. When K1 ├    K2 then it does not follow that if 
a is canonically relevant to b modulo K2 then it is so modulo K1. Example: Put K1  
{pq}, K2  {pq}. Then K1  ├    K2 and p is canonically relevant to q modulo K2, but 
is not so modulo K1.  
 
 
5. Syntax-Independent – but Still Language-Dependent 
 
As remarked in the preceding section, canonical relevance is syntax-independent in 
the usual sense that it is invariant under logical equivalence in all three of its 
arguments a,b,K. However, there is also a sense in which it is still not fully language-
independent. Its definition, whether via paths or cells, gives a privileged place to 
elementary letters over compound formulae. As a result, it turns out that whether one 
state of affairs is relevant to another depends on how we deploy elementary letters in 
representing them. This is the first main new result of the paper. 
 
Example 5.1. Consider the belief set {pq, (pq)p}. Clearly, p is not canonically 
relevant to (pq)p modulo the belief set, since p  p*, ((pq)p)*  q, and the 
belief set is equivalent to {p,q}. Now suppose we represent our states of affairs in a 
different manner. Noting that the formulae p and pq are logically independent of 
each other (all four combinations of their truth and falsity are possible), we might let 
the letter p continue to represent the same state of affairs as before, but use the letter q 
to stand for the one previously denoted by pq. Then the formula qp stands for the 
state of affairs previously represented by (pq)p. So under our second 
representation scheme, the belief set is written as {q, qp}, which is again equivalent 
to {p,q}. We now ask whether p (corresponding to the old p) is canonically relevant to 
qp (corresponding to the old (pq)p) modulo the new belief set. This time the 
answer is trivially positive (modulo any belief set) since p*  p shares a letter with 
(qp)*  qp. Changing the way in which we represent states of affairs has thus 
changed the answer to our question! 
 
In case this looks like a sleight-of-hand, we review Example 5.1 more formally. First, 
we give the construction itself.  
 
Observation 5.1. Let L be the propositional language generated by the letters {p,q}, 
and define f: L  L by putting f(p)  p, f(q)  pq, and homomorphic for compound 
formulae. Then there is a bijection  between valuations on the language such that for 
all formulae a  L, v(a)  v(f(a)), where v: L  {0,1} is the counterpart (v) of v: L 
 {0,1}. 
 
The homomorphism condition means of course that f(a)  f(a), f(ab)  f(a)f(b), 
f(ab)  f(a)f(b), f()  . The good behaviour of the formula-homomorphism f 
with respect to the valuation-bijection  gives mathematical content to the intuitive 
idea that f does not alter semantic structure; more specifically, that the formula a 
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represents (under v) the same ‘state of affairs’ as f(a) does (under v). For a proof of 
Observation 5.1, see Appendix C.  
 
Now checking for what is relevant to what, we see (Figure 5.1): 
 
 On the one hand, trivially the formula p is canonically relevant to qp 
modulo the belief set K  {q, qp} (or any other) since p*  p shares a letter 
with (qp)*  qp.  
 
 On the other hand, f(p)  p is not canonically relevant to f(qp)  (pq)p 
modulo f(K)  f({q, qp})  {pq, (pq)p)}, since (f(p))*  p*  p while 
(f(qp))*  ((pq)p)*  q and (f(K))#  {p,q} = K#.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Example of language-dependence of canonical relevance modulo K 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, while the concept of canonical relevance is syntax-independent as usually 
understood, i.e. invariant under logical equivalence in all three of its arguments, it 
nevertheless remains language-dependent, in the deeper sense that it is not invariant 
under different representations of the same state of affairs – even when the 
representations are in the same language. To this extent it is not entirely semantic, 
retaining a residual syntactic element that may be difficult or impossible to eliminate.  
 
The phenomenon does not appear to have been discussed in the literature, but may be 
of some importance. It goes well beyond the problem of relevance. Any concept 
whose definition gives a privileged role to elementary letters (or in the case of 
predicate logic, atomic formulae) is likely to be language-dependent in the same way. 
This seems to be the case, for example, with certain concepts that have been used in 
artificial intelligence to define particular forms of nonmonotonic reasoning, notably 
the closed world assumption and circumscription. 
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How should the language-dependence of the relation of canonical relevance be 
appreciated? Two contrasting attitudes suggest themselves. 
 
 It may be felt that in view of this feature, canonical relevance is not much 
better behaved than its less sophisticated predecessors, which were seen to be 
syntax-dependent in one or more of their arguments a, x, K. For this reason it 
should simply be abandoned (along with all other language-dependent 
concepts such as circumscription). 
 
 On the other hand, it may be felt that language-dependent notions (and perhaps 
even some syntax-dependent ones) do have their legitimate uses, particularly 
in computational contexts.  
 
Without taking a definite stance on this delicate question, we note that canonical 
relevance has very interesting interactions with operations of belief change, which we 
now examine.   
 
 
6. Respecting Relevance in Belief Change  
 
How far do operations of belief change in the manner of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and 
Makinson (1985), briefly AGM, respect relevance? We begin by reviewing the state 
of play, focussing on the operation of contraction (thus leaving aside revision) and 
omitting all proofs (which can be found in Kourousias and Makinson (2007)).  
 
Definition 6.1. We say that an operation  of contraction on a contingent belief set K 
respects canonical relevance (briefly, when no ambiguity is possible, respects 
relevance) iff whenever K ├   x but Ka  ├ / x then a is canonically relevant to x (mod K). 
Contrapositively, when K ├     x and a is canonically irrelevant to x (mod K) then still 
Ka ├   x.  
 
Comment. When K is closed under classical consequence, i.e. when K = Cn(K) then 
for AGM contraction Ka is also closed under consequence, so we have K ├   x iff x  
K and likewise  Ka ├    x iff x  Ka. In this situation, Definition 6.1 is equivalent to 
one with epsilon replacing turnstile: whenever x  K and a is canonically irrelevant to 
x (mod K) then still x  Ka.  
 
Observation 6.1. (Parikh 1999): AGM contraction can fail to respect relevance, and 
this can happen independently of whether K is closed under consequence. 
 
Example 6.1. Let p,q be two distinct elementary letters, and put K = Cn(p,q). Then 
there is an AGM maxichoice contraction that puts Kp to be Cn(pq), thus 
eliminating not only p but also q from K. However, the letter q is canonically 
irrelevant to p modulo K, because we can split E = {p,q} into E1 = {p}, E2 = {q} with 
K
#
 = {p}{q}.   
 
The example is robust in the sense that it goes through when we work with belief 
bases rather than belief sets already closed under consequence. Put K0 = {pq,q}, so 
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that Cn(K0) = K above. Then one of the AGM maxichoice base contractions puts K0p 
to be {pq}, which eliminates q. However, the eliminated letter q is canonically 
irrelevant to p modulo K0 for the same reason as before. 
 
Theorem 6.2 (Kourousias and Makinson 2007). If we apply AGM contraction to the 
finest splitting K
#
 of a contingent belief set K, rather than to K itself, then it respects 
relevance.  
 
Example 6.2. When given K = Cn(p,q) or K0 = {pq,q} the theorem instructs us to 
apply the contraction operation to the canonical belief set K
#
 = K0
#
 = {p,q}. Since 
there is just one maximal p-nonimplying subset of K
#
, namely {q}, there is just one 
possible output for an AGM belief contraction K
#p, namely {q}.     
 
Comments. (1) Actually, the observation of Parikh (1999) was made for AGM 
revision, but the counterexamples for revision and contraction are essentially the 
same. (2) Theorem 6.2 was established by Kourousias and Makinson (2007) for the 
epsilon version of Definition 6.1, rather than the turnstile version. When a belief set is 
not closed under classical consequence (as in the case of K
#
) the two versions are not 
the same, as remarked by Pavlos Peppas (personal communication). However, it is not 
difficult to obtain the turnstile version of the theorem from the epsilon one, as is done 
in Appendix C. 
 
 
7. Should Canonical Relevance always be Respected? 
 
Of course, we may ask whether eliminating canonically irrelevant formulae really is a 
shortcoming for a belief contraction operation. Assuming that canonical relevance 
modulo a belief set is itself a reasonable notion to work with (despite its language-
dependence, already noted) we may still ask: is failure to respect it a defect, or just a 
feature, of AGM contraction?  
 
It appears that the answer depends on whether we want our contractions to take into 
account only formal considerations, or also epistemic ones. To see this, consider again 
the example where we wish to contract the belief base K0 = {pq,q} by p.  
 
We know that K
#
 = {p,q}, so that while pq is canonically relevant to p modulo K0, 
q is not. So if the contraction is to respect relevance, it will eliminate pq, but not q. 
But it may happen that the formula pq has a special place among our beliefs. It may 
be more deeply entrenched, less vulnerable, or in some other way epistemically more 
basic than the letters p,q or their conjunction pq, all of which are elements of 
Cn(K0). In that context, when discarding p we should keep the biconditional pq and 
jettison the letter q. The eliminated formula q is not logically relevant to the formula p 
that we are discarding, but it is epistemically so, since it occurs in a formula pq to 
which we are attributing special epistemic status within the belief set.  
 
In general, when a belief set is presented by a base, we may have differing attitudes 
towards the propositions in the base. They may be there by happenstance, and any 
other base might be deemed as just as appropriate so long as it is equivalent (and 
perhaps satisfies general requirements such as being computable or schematic). But 
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other propositions may be in the base because we want them to be there; they may 
have an epistemic priority over items outside the base. Even within the base, some 
elements may have priority over others. From this perspective, taking epistemic 
matters into account, we will not need to respect canonical relevance.  
 
 
8. Parameter- Sensitive Relevance 
 
If we are interested in epistemic factors in belief change, we may well wish to develop 
the concept of canonical relevance to take account of them. How could we go about 
it? Of course, logic alone cannot specify which propositions have what epistemic 
status. But it can introduce into its constructions parameters that allow such 
specifications to play a role. In this section we introduce such a parameter. This is the 
second main new construction of the paper. 
 
Definitions and theorems correspond to earlier unparametrized ones, and are 
numbered by their counterparts with a plus sign. We begin by observing that the finest 
splitting theorem may be strengthened to cover an arbitrary family of splittings, rather 
than just the family of all splittings of K.   
 
Theorem 3.1

. Let K be any contingent set of formulae of classical propositional logic. 
The infimum of any non-empty family of splittings of K is also a splitting of K.  
 
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3.1 (the finest splitting theorem) that is given in 
Kourousias and Makinson (2007) may be applied without change.        
 
Next, we notice that the concept of canonical cell/path relevance, which was 
introduced in Definition 4.2 using the finest splitting of K, generalizes without change 
with respect to an arbitrary splitting. In terms of cells, for instance, we have:  
 
Definition 4.2

. Let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic and K be a 
contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set with E = {Ei}iI any splitting of K. 
We say that a is relevant to b (mod E) iff a* shares some letter with b*, or there is a 
cell Ei of E such that each of a* and b* shares some letter (not necessarily the same 
letter) with Ei.  
 
The notion of respect for relevance, introduced Definition 6.1, similarly generalizes:  
 
Definition 6.1

. Let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set, and E = 
{Ei}iI any splitting of K. We say that an operation  of contraction on K respects 
relevance modulo E iff whenever K ├   x but Ka  ├ / x then a is relevant to x modulo E.  
 
With these generalized definitions available, we can now introduce a parameter R to 
handle extra-logical (and in particular, epistemic) sources of relevance. R is a relation 
between elementary letters, permitting us to stipulate that certain letters are 
epistemically relevant to others. 
 
Definition 8.1. Let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set, with E its 
least letter-set. Let R be any relation between letters in E. We say that a splitting E = 
{Ei}iI of K protects R  iff whenever (p,q)  R then p,q are in the same cell Ei of E.  
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We may now apply Theorem 3.1

 to the family of all R-protecting splittings of K: 
 
Corollary to Theorem 3.1

. Let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief 
set, with E its least letter-set. Let R be any relation between letters in E. Then K has a 
(unique) finest R-protecting splitting.  
 
Proof. Since R  E2, there is at least one splitting that protects R, namely the coarsest 
(one-cell) splitting. Hence by Theorem 3.1

, the infimum of all R-protecting splittings 
of K is a splitting of K, and it is immediate that it protects R.  
 
The relation of relevance modulo the finest R-protecting splitting of K (rather than 
modulo its finest splitting) may naturally be referred to as R-sensitive relevance. 
When the pairs in R represent declarations of epistemic connections between letters, it 
may be thought of as representing epistemically sensitive relevance.  
 
The extent to which R-sensitive relevance goes beyond canonical relevance evidently 
depends on how much is put into the protected relation R. In the limiting case that R is 
empty, the two coincide; in the other limiting case that R contains all pairs of letters, 
we get the one-cell partition of E  E0(K) and so end up with Rodrigues’ path-
relevance without splitting as in section 2. 
 
We end by noting that the same proof as for Theorem 6.2 gives us more generally: 
 
Theorem 6.2

. Let K be a contingent set of formulae serving as a belief set, with E its 
least letter-set. Let R be any relation between letters in E. If we apply AGM 
contraction to the finest R-protecting splitting rather than to K itself, then it respects 
relevance modulo that same splitting.  
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Literature on Relevance as a Two-Place Relation 
 
For an overview and extended bibliography of work on propositional relevance as a 
two-place relation between formulae, see Lang et al (2003). This paper gives 
particular attention to computational questions. Although the authors mention the 
seminal paper Parikh (1996) in passing, they do not investigate relevance modulo the 
finest splitting of a background belief set. In their treatment of the notion of an 
essential letter they follow Ryan (1991) in dividing the concept into two parts, thereby 
giving it a polarity. Expressed in the manner of the present paper, we may say that a 
formula a sometimes depends on a positive value for the letter p iff there is a valuation 
v with v(a) 1 but vp0(a)  0, where vp0 is the valuation that agrees with v on all 
letters other than p but gives p the value 0. Likewise, a sometimes depends on a 
negative value for the letter p iff there is a valuation v with v(a) 1 but vp1(a)  0. 
Evidently, the two kinds of dependence do not exclude each other. As Lang et al 
(2003) observe, it is immediate that the essential letters of a formula are just those on 
which it sometimes depends either positively or negatively.  
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Appendix B: Table of Kinds of Relevance Discussed 
 
Name  Arguments Syntax- 
independent? 
Language-
independent? 
syntactic 
relevance 
 
formulae 
no  
 
 
 
 
no 
essential 
relevance 
yes 
path-relevance  
formulae, belief set K 
 
 
yes, except for K 
 
cell-relevance 
canonical 
(path/cell) 
relevance 
yes 
R-sensitive 
relevance 
formulae, belief set K, 
relation R over letters 
yes 
 
 
Appendix C: Proofs 
 
Observation 3.2. For contingent K the Bi in the finest splittings of K are unique up to 
tautological equivalence. That is: let K be a contingent belief set, and E = {Ei}iI its 
finest splitting. Suppose  both K ┤├   {Bi}iI and K ┤├   {Bi}iI where E(Bi)  Ei and 
E(Bi)  Ei. Then each Bi ┤├  Bi. 
 
Notation. We write v(X)  1 as shorthand for v(x)  1 for all x  X, while v(X)  0 
abbreviates v(x)  0 for some x  X. 
 
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then there is a valuation u with say u(Bj)  1 and u(Bj)  
0. Since K is consistent, there is also a valuation v with v(K) = 1 so v(Bi)  v(Bi)  1 
for all i  I. Let w be the valuation that agrees with u on all letters in Ej and agrees 
with v on all other letters. Then w(K)  w({Bi}iI)   1 while also w(K)  
w({Bi}iI)   0 giving a contradiction.  
 
Theorem 4.1. Canonical path-relevance is equivalent to canonical cell-relevance. In 
detail: let a,b be formulae of classical propositional logic, and let K be a contingent 
set of formulae serving as a belief set. Then a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod 
K) iff it is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K). 
 
Proof. The theorem is immediate when a* shares a letter with b*. So suppose 
otherwise.  
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Left to right: Suppose that a is canonically path-relevant to b (mod K). Then there is a 
finite sequence x0,…xn+1 of formulae with x0 = a*, xn+1 = b*, all of x1,…,xn  K
#
, and 
each xi sharing at least one letter with xi+1. Since a* shares no letter with b*, we have 
n  1. Let p be a letter shared by x0 = a* and x1, and let q be a letter shared by xn and 
xn+1 = b*. Since all of x1,…,xn  K
#
, and each xi shares at least one letter with xi+1, it 
follows that all of the letters in x1,…,xn come from the same cell Ei of the finest 
splitting of K. Thus in particular p and q come from the same cell Ei, so each of the 
sets E(a*)Ei and E(b*)Ei is non-empty as required for canonical cell-relevance.    
 
Right to left: Suppose that a is canonically cell-relevant to b (mod K). Then there is a 
cell Ei of the finest splitting E of K such that each of the sets E(a*)Ei and E(b*)Ei 
is non-empty. So there are letters p, q  Ei with p occurring in a* and q occurring in 
b*. Since p, q  Ei and K
#
 is in least letter-set form, they must occur in formulae y, z 
 Bi  K
#
. To complete the proof we need to show that there are x1,…,xn (n  0) in K
#
 
with y = x1, xn = z and each xi sharing a letter with xi+1. But this must hold because 
otherwise we could take the closure {y}
+
 of {y} under the relation of sharing a letter, 
to divide Ei further into non-empty sets E({y}
+
) and Ei\ E({y}
+
) which would split K 
further.   
 
Observation 5.1. Let L be the propositional language generated by the letters {p,q}, 
and define f: L  L by putting f(p)  p, f(q)  pq, and homomorphic for compound 
formulae. Then there is a bijection  between valuations on the language such that 
such that for all formulae a  L, v(a)  v(f(a)), where v: L  {0,1} is the counterpart 
(v) of v: L  {0,1}. 
 
Proof. We construct the bijection  as follows: for each valuation v: L  {0,1} define 
(v)  v: L  {0,1} by setting v(p)  v(p) and v(q)  v(pq). We need to check that 
(1)  is a bijection between valuations on L, and (2) for all formulae a  L, v(a)  
v(f(a). 
 
For (1), since the set of valuations is finite (4 elements), it suffices to show that  is 
injective. Suppose v  w; we need to show v  w. Case 1: Suppose v(p)  w(p). Then 
immediately v(p)  v(p)  w(p)  w(p) and we are done. Case 2: Suppose v(p)  w(p) 
but v(q)  w(q). Then v(pq)  w(pq) so v(q)  v(pq)  w(pq)  w(q) and 
again we are done. 
 
For (2), it suffices to show that v(p)  v(f(p)) and v(q)  v(f(q)). The former is 
immediate since v(f(p))  v(p)  v(p) by the constructions of f and v. For the latter, 
v(f(q))  v(pq) by the construction of f. Case 1: Suppose v(q)  1. Then v(q)  
v(pq)  v(p)  v(p) so v(pq)  1, giving us v(q)  v(f(q)) as desired. Case 2: 
Suppose v(q)  0. Then v(q)  v(pq)  v(p)  v(p) so v(pq)  0, again giving 
us v(q)  v(f(q)) as desired. 
 
Theorem 6.2.  If we apply AGM contraction to the finest splitting K
#
 of a contingent 
belief set K, rather than to K itself, then it respects relevance.  
 
Proof. In Kourousias and Makinson (2007) this was proven in an ‘epsilon version’: 
whenever x  K# but x  K#a then a is canonically relevant to x (mod K). We need 
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to derive the turnstile version of the theorem from the epsilon one. Assume the 
epsilon version, i.e. that for  contingent K, whenever x  K# but x  K#a then a is 
canonically relevant to x (mod K). Suppose that K is contingent, K
#
 ├  x, K
#a  ├ / x; we 
need to show that a is canonically relevant to x (mod K).  
 
Since K
#
 ├  x we have K
#
 ├  x*, so there are a1,…,ak  K
#
 with a1…ak ├  x*. Since K 
is consistent, we may assume without loss of generality that each ai* shares a letter 
with x*. Since K
#a ├ / x we likewise have K#a  ├ /  x*, so there is an i  k with K#a  ├ /  
ai, so that ai  K
#a. By the epsilon version of the theorem, a is canonically relevant 
to ai (mod K). That is, there is a cell Ej of the finest partition E of K such that each of 
the sets E(a*)Ej and E(ai*)Ej is non-empty.  
 
To show that a is canonically relevant to x (mod K) and complete the proof it will 
suffice to show that E(x*)Ej is non-empty. But since ai  K
#
 all the letters of ai 
come from the same cell, so E(ai)  Ej. Since E(ai*)  E(ai) this gives us E(ai*)  Ej. 
Since ai* shares a letter with x*, this tells us that E(x*)Ej is non-empty as desired. 
  
It is also possible to prove Theorem 6.2 (turnstile version) directly, essentially by 
including the above considerations within a re-run of the proof of the epsilon version 
in Kourousias and Makinson (2007).  
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